References of "Gautier, Axel"
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See detailL'économie collaborative
Gautier, Axel ULiege

Conference given outside the academic context (2017)

Detailed reference viewed: 16 (1 ULiège)
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See detailA Simulator to Explore Tarification Designs for Distribution Networks
Manuel de Villena Millan, Miguel ULiege; Gautier, Axel ULiege; Fonteneau, Raphaël ULiege et al

E-print/Working paper (2017)

This paper introduces a computational tool to help assess the impact of regulation policies within distribution net- works in the deployment of distributed renewable electricity generation. This tool is a ... [more ▼]

This paper introduces a computational tool to help assess the impact of regulation policies within distribution net- works in the deployment of distributed renewable electricity generation. This tool is a comprehensive multi-agent simulator capable of handling the interaction between the users of a distribution network and their distribution system operator. With this simulator, it is possible to address the different regulatory constraints encountered by distribution system operators, for any regulation policy. In the simulator, we model individual electricity consumers as rational agents, who may invest in optimised distributed renewable energy installations, if they are cost-efficient compared to the network tariff. By modelling the cost recovery scheme of the distribution system operator, the simulator then computes the evolution of the network tariff in response to a change in the consumption and generation of the consumers in the distribution network, due to the deployment of distributed generation. The simulator is illustrated with various regulation policies. [less ▲]

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Peer Reviewed
See detailSmallest salable patent practicing unit (SSPPU) and component licensing: Why $1 is not $1?
Gautier, Axel ULiege

Conference (2017, September)

Detailed reference viewed: 27 (0 ULiège)
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See detailNet neutrality: Paid prioritization vs Zero-rating
Gautier, Axel ULiege

Conference (2017, July)

Detailed reference viewed: 27 (1 ULiège)
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See detailA Theory of Soft Capture
Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel ULiege

in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (2017), 119(3), 571-596

n this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three-tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to ... [more ▼]

n this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three-tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator. The firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the regulator. In a self-enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm-produced signal, internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents. The main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 94 (24 ULiège)
See detailHardware vs. software: How to make the energy system smarter?
Gautier, Axel ULiege

Scientific conference (2017, June 27)

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See detailNet neutrality: Paid prioritization vs Zero-rating
Gautier, Axel ULiege

Conference (2017, June)

Detailed reference viewed: 33 (0 ULiège)
See detailSmallest salable patent practicing unit (SSPPU) and component licensing: Why $1 is not $1?
Gautier, Axel ULiege

Scientific conference (2017, May 29)

Detailed reference viewed: 12 (1 ULiège)
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See detailThe exclusion of competing one-way essential complements: implications for net neutrality
Broos, Sébastien ULiege; Gautier, Axel ULiege

in International Journal of Industrial Organization (2017), 52

We analyze the incentives of internet service providers (ISPs) to break net neutrality by excluding competing one-way essential complements, i.e. internet applications competing with their own products. A ... [more ▼]

We analyze the incentives of internet service providers (ISPs) to break net neutrality by excluding competing one-way essential complements, i.e. internet applications competing with their own products. A typical example is the exclusion of VoIP applications by telecom companies offering internet and voice services. A monopoly ISP may want to exclude a competing internet app if it is of inferior quality and the ISP cannot ask for a surcharge for its use. Competition between ISPs never leads to full app exclusion but it may lead to a fragmented internet where only one ISP offers the application. We show that, both in monopoly and duopoly, prohibiting the exclusion of the app and surcharges for its use does not always improve welfare. [less ▲]

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See detailThe prosumers and the grid
Gautier, Axel ULiege

Scientific conference (2017, April 25)

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See detailThe prosumers and the grid
Gautier, Axel ULiege

Conference (2017, April)

Detailed reference viewed: 12 (2 ULiège)
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See detailThe prosumers and the grid
Gautier, Axel ULiege; Jacqmin, Julien ULiege; poudou, jean-christophe

Conference (2017, February 07)

Detailed reference viewed: 19 (1 ULiège)
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See detailStrategic bypass deterrence
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULiege

in Journal of Regulatory Economics (2017), 52

In liberalized network industries, competitors can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own capacity (bypass). We revisit this make-or-buy problem making ... [more ▼]

In liberalized network industries, competitors can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own capacity (bypass). We revisit this make-or-buy problem making two contributions to the literature. First we analyze both the profit maximizing behavior of an incumbent and the welfare maximizing behavior when the entrant chooses between access and bypass. Second, we extend the baseline model studied in the literature by allowing for fixed costs of network installation. By analogy to the literature on strategic entry deterrence, we distinguish three regimes of blockaded bypass, deterred bypass and accommodated bypass depending on the entrant's unit cost. We show that the make-or-buy decision of the entrant is not necessarily technologically efficient: when bypass is chosen, it is always the cheapest option but access may be chosen when it is not cost effective. [less ▲]

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See detailThe prosumers and the grid
Gautier, Axel ULiege; Jacqmin, Julien ULiege; Poudou, Jean-Christophe

E-print/Working paper (2017)

Prosumers are households that are both producers and consumers of electricity. A prosumer has a grid-connected decentralized production unit (DPU) and makes two types of exchanges with the grid: energy ... [more ▼]

Prosumers are households that are both producers and consumers of electricity. A prosumer has a grid-connected decentralized production unit (DPU) and makes two types of exchanges with the grid: energy imports when the local production is insufficient to match the local consumption and energy exports when local production exceeds it. There exists two systems to measure the exchanges : a net metering system that uses a single meter to measure the balance between exports and imports and a net purchasing system that uses two meters to measure separately power exports and imports. Both systems are currently used for residential consumption. We build a model to compare the two metering systems. Under net metering, the price of exports paid to prosumers is implicitly set at the price of the electricity that they import. We show that net metering leads to (1) too many prosumers, (2) a decrease in the bills of prosumers, compensated via a higher bill for traditional consumers, and (3) a lack of incentives to synchronize local production and consumption. [less ▲]

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See detailLa SNCB : prête pour la libéralisation totale du rail ?
Gautier, Axel ULiege; Salem, Iman

in Regards Economiques (2016)

La SNCB n’a pas su s’adapter à la libéralisation du fret ferroviaire faute de rentabilité. Dans la perspective d’une libéralisation du transport de passagers annoncée pour 2023, nous évaluons les ... [more ▼]

La SNCB n’a pas su s’adapter à la libéralisation du fret ferroviaire faute de rentabilité. Dans la perspective d’une libéralisation du transport de passagers annoncée pour 2023, nous évaluons les performances de l’entreprise. Notre étude met en avant un déficit de productivité et une contribution faible des passagers aux coûts par rapport à d’autres opérateurs européens. [less ▲]

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See detailSSPPU: Why 1$ is not 1$
Gautier, Axel ULiege

Scientific conference (2016, November 21)

Detailed reference viewed: 22 (0 ULiège)
See detailHardware vs. software platforms: How to make the energy grid smarter?
Gautier, Axel ULiege; Jacqmin, Julien ULiege

Scientific conference (2016, November 04)

Detailed reference viewed: 26 (1 ULiège)
Peer Reviewed
See detailCartels in the EU: who appeals and who wins?
Gautier, Axel ULiege

Conference (2016, November)

Detailed reference viewed: 21 (0 ULiège)
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See detailDéfi climatique: l'état et le marché
Gautier, Axel ULiege

Conference given outside the academic context (2016)

Detailed reference viewed: 20 (1 ULiège)