

The Cultural Turn in International Aid

Impacts and Challenges for Heritage
and the Creative Industries

Edited by
Sophia Labadi

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2020
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa
business*

© 2020 selection and editorial matter, Sophia Labadi; individual
chapters, the contributors

The right of Sophia Labadi to be identified as the author of the
editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters,
has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.


British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British
Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-0-8153-8229-4

ISBN: 978-1-351-20859-8

Typeset in Sabon
by codeMantra



Printed in the United Kingdom
by Henry Ling Limited

Con

Lis
Lis
Lis

1 Th
SO

PART I
Defini
and re

2 Cr
ins
CH

3 Cu
di
CH

4 Ho
KA

5 U
th
SO

PART
Natio
for cu

6 W
in
BE

2 Creative economy and development

International institutions and policy synchronization

*Christiaan De Beukelaer and
Antonios Vlassis*

The creative economy: framing arts and culture in economic terms

In 1988, John Myerscough published *The Economic Impact of the Arts in Britain* with the Policy Research Institute (Myerscough 1988). This controversial work both marked and advanced a shift in cultural policy thinking: The value of culture should no longer be defended as a mere public good that deserves public funding to compensate for widespread 'market failure' in the sector, it can also be defended through the multiplier effect the sector has on the economy as a whole. Pointing out the economic impact of the arts served as a basis to try persuading governments to increase public funding for the sector (Selwood 2010). This has proven both useful and dangerous.

The argument that cultural production, both of the publicly funded and the private kind, are of economic importance was not entirely new. Thinking about the arts and the cultural industries had come a long way since the advent of a designated Ministry in 1959 in France (under André Malraux as the first Minister of Cultural Affairs) and the foundation of the Arts Council in 1946 in the United Kingdom (UK) (with John Maynard Keynes as its first Chairperson). In the period after the Second World War, a strict distinction between the arts and popular (i.e. commercial, mass) culture remained. This distinction allowed critics to dismiss the 'culture industry' as a travesty undermining the value of the arts (Adorno 2001), while justifying public spending on 'high arts' for their intrinsic value and the need to disclose such works to the greatest possible audience.

In the 1980s, this distinction became difficult to maintain. First, it became obvious the market is able to supply existing demand for most people (see Keat 2000). Second, the arts and culture actually had large audiences (at least when including 'popular' art forms most people engage with in the definition of culture), but did not receive the attention of governments' cultural policies (Looseley 1995, 113ff). Third, the postmodern critique of rigid distinctions between 'high' and 'low' art made the postwar arrangement difficult to uphold (Eling 1999, 128ff).

The shift from an intrinsic defence of funding for arts and culture to a more instrumental defence has been accelerated by two key moments that would give way to a far more optimistic reading of the sector, soon renamed 'creative industries' and later 'creative economy'.

First, the 'New Labour' Party government in the UK (DCMS 1998; Smith 1998) and Australia (Government of Australia 2005) adopted mapping and policy documents that promoted the 'creative industries' as a driver of economic growth in their deindustrializing (and already largely deindustrialized) societies (Hesmondhalgh, Oakley, and Lee 2015). While the adoption of the 'creative industries' term created a break with the more critical connotation the 'cultural industries' had in this context (Hesmondhalgh 2013; O'Connor 2010), it also served as a way to include software in the light of the late-1990s excitement and optimism about the information society and digital technologies (Garnham 2005; Tremblay 2011). This gave way to a widespread optimism, or 'celebratory' interpretation of the creative industries (see De Beukelaer and Spence 2019), echoed in a wide range of semi-academic publications (Florida 2002; Howkins 2002).

Second, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) started to engage with the 'creative industries' at their 'XIth Session' in São Paulo (2004). This gave way to UNCTAD's mandate to develop the empirically informed and policy-oriented Creative Economy Reports (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008, 2010). While UNCTAD's reports proved very influential around the world, and in particular in 'developing countries', their particular definition and scope is merely one among many that circulate in policy discourses around the world (Vlassis and De Beukelaer 2019).

In sum, the 'culture industry', a term coined to critically challenge the increasing reduction of art and culture to their economic worth became a 'celebratory' term ('creative industries') that would help revive economies, regenerate cities and create employment in a post-manufacturing UK economy (De Beukelaer and Spence 2019). Once embraced as the 'creative economy' by the international institutions (Vlassis and De Beukelaer 2019), these organizations equated its potential with the neoliberal development doxa: more economic activity would boost economies, create jobs and increase exports.

The development they propagate is neither self-evident nor inevitable. More importantly, this kind of development relies less on 'aid' than on a shift in discourse. This is important because the term 'development' went through a similar narrowing of its meaning, as the term became synonymous with efforts to have 'underdeveloped' postcolonial countries 'catch up' with industrialized ones in terms of standard of living and life expectancy (Yanguas 2018). Indeed, 'development' itself is a discursive formation of both what 'underdeveloped' countries are and how 'development' can help overcome the problem it discursively creates (Escobar 1995;

Nederv
opment
tutes leg
and Du

Beacu
and pec
how it c
industri
lines th
underde
cial resj
proble
fication
(Barnet

In th
related
organizat
discurs
thereby
omy' b
plore th
industr
players
(WIPC
as the
course
and sci
expose
collabo

Institu

Intergo
WIPO
and th
policy
ance a
Alasun
tional
who a
by dif
global
velopr
of pec
chron

Nederveen Pieterse 2010). This means that 'a particular meaning of development orients social activity in particular directions, defines what constitutes legitimate knowledge, and shapes whose knowledge matters' (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3).

Because development 'aid' exists in this context means 'aiding' countries and people, there has to be some agreement on what the problem is and how it can be solved. This is what underlies the use of cultural and creative industries as drivers of development: the discursive construction that outlines the 'creative contributions' that arts and culture make to overcoming underdevelopment (Stupples 2014). International institutions, in this crucial respect, help to identify the problems that need to be solved, define the problem in relationship to a category of actions and goals, produce classifications for others and offer judgements about what kind of problem it is (Barnett and Finnemore 2005, 179).

In this chapter, we explore the definitions of the 'creative economy' and related terms as they are used by international and intergovernmental organizations. We clarify that the 'aid' these organizations provide is mainly discursive: they are able to produce systems of meaning and signification, thereby legitimizing a focus on arts and culture through the 'creative economy' by claiming this supports development. In order to do so, we explore the definitions and models of the sector – cultural industries, creative industries, creative economy – across five key international institutional players: UNCTAD, UNESCO, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), as well as the British Council. We highlight the historical pathways of the discourse used in each institution and thereby aim to clarify the definition and scope of each of these organizations' use of the 'creative economy', to expose tensions and overlaps, and discuss implications for aid, funding, collaboration and policy.

Institutional perspectives

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs, such as UNCTAD, UNESCO and WIPO) and International organizations (IOs, such as the British Council and the OIF) have played significant roles in the spread and uptake of key policy terms across a range of issues. Sustainability, development, governance and social cohesion are clear examples of this. Political scientist Pertti Alasuutari describes this process in his book *The Synchronisation of National Policies* (Alasuutari 2016), by pointing out that a 'tribe of moderns' who are often part of the same social and cultural network, but employed by different organizations and governments have tremendous influence over global policy discourse. The claim that the creative economy can drive development has made this discourse visible and appealing to diverse groups of people within the influential global 'tribe of moderns'. But despite 'synchronization' of policy discourses across individual countries in relation

to the 'creative economy', there are clear differences in the terms used by differences around the world. He points out that,

This shift from seeing cultural policy servicing democratic access to art and social cohesion of the people to conceiving of culture as a tourist attraction and as a means to enhance 'creative economy' has swept throughout the advanced economies, and the creative city is now a standard catchword that can be found in the strategy documents of almost any city in the world.

(Alasuutari 2016, 154–155)

The central tenet of the uptake of the 'creative economy' in virtually all its guises is that 'cultural policy, which has traditionally been justified by art as valuable in its own right, is now commonly justified by the claim that it is beneficial for business and economy' (Alasuutari 2016, 156). But in their respective struggles for influence, these organizations have promoted different perspectives on the 'creative economy' (Vlassis and De Beukelaer 2019). Here, we explore briefly what these differences are before discussing why they matter so much.

These organizations hardly engage in 'aid' (through funding). Their concern with 'development' is mainly a discursive one. Before turning to a comparison and discussion of their respective perspectives, it seems useful to highlight the key characteristics of these organizations in brief.

UNCTAD

UNCTAD was founded in 1964, in response to the realization that 'developing' countries encountered great difficulties in exporting manufactured goods to 'developed' countries. UNCTAD started focusing on culture and creativity sectors in the late 1990s. In 2004, at the XIth interministerial meeting in São Paulo, there was a high-level panel on the creative industries. This meeting led to the creation of a designated Creative Economy Unit headed by the economist Edna dos Santos Duisenberg, who went on to elaborate the Creative Economy Report series (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008, 2010) as well as an overview of international trade in creative goods and services as part of the UNCTAD statistical database (Vlassis 2018). In the Creative Economy Reports, UNCTAD provides a working definition in which the creative industries:

- are the cycles of creation, production and distribution of goods and services that use creativity and intellectual capital as primary inputs;
- constitute a set of knowledge-based activities, focused on but not limited to arts, potentially generating revenues from trade and intellectual property rights;

- comprise tangibles with creative services
- stand at the core of the creative economy
- constitute a new economic sector

UNCTAD's focus on export diversification and 'trade not aid' doctrine

UNESCO

UNESCO was founded in 1945 for Culture (alongside Education and Science) with a legitimate and significant role in the field of culture. But its focus on development (WCC) and industries in the past (WCC) is a challenge for the World Heritage Convention for Cultural Development and UNESCO 1992 Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions of the Creative Economy. UNESCO's 2005 Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions is an explicit engagement with cultural and economic development. Laer, Pyykkönen, and others have argued that the cultural industries

Article 4(4): "Creative activities, goods and services, as a specific attention to the expressions, irrespective of the activities may be production of cultural goods and services"

Article 4(5): "The distribution of cultural goods and services"

UNESCO established in 2010, as stipulated in the Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions

- comprise tangible products and intangible intellectual or artistic services with creative content, economic value and market objectives;
 - stand at the crossroads of the artisan, services and industrial sectors and
 - constitute a new dynamic sector in world trade
- (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008, 8)

UNCTAD's focus on the creative economy is part of its commitment to export diversification as a driver of economic development, as part of its 'trade not aid' doxa—now more commonly 'aid for trade'.

UNESCO

UNESCO was founded in 1946 as the United Nations' agency with a mandate for Culture (alongside Education and Science), it is also the only UN agency with a legitimate and clearly recognized interest in culture. UNESCO's 1972 World Heritage Convention, which recognizes cultural and natural sites of significance to mankind, is its best known and most visible initiative in the field of culture. But alongside forays into the role of culture in processes of development (WCCD 1996; UNESCO 1998), it has also focused on cultural industries in the past decades. This includes the report *Cultural Industries: A Challenge for The Future of Culture* (UNESCO 1982), the World Decade for Cultural Development (1988–1997), the *Dakar Plan for Action* (OAU and UNESCO 1992), the *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* (UNESCO 2005), a 'special edition' of the Creative Economy Report (UNESCO and UNDP 2013).

UNESCO's 2005 *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*, is particularly interesting as it includes explicit engagement with the role cultural industries can play in the social, cultural and economic development of 'developing' countries (De Beukelaer, Pyykkönen, and Singh 2015; Vlassis 2015a). The Convention defines the cultural industries as follows:

Article 4(4): "Cultural activities, goods and services" refers to those activities, goods and services, which at the time they are considered as a specific attribute, use or purpose, embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective of the commercial value they may have. Cultural activities may be an end in themselves, or they may contribute to the production of cultural goods and services.

Article 4(5): "Cultural industries" refers to industries producing and distributing cultural goods or services as defined in paragraph 4 above.
(UNESCO 2005, Article 4)

UNESCO established the *International Fund for Cultural Diversity* in 2010, as stipulated in Article 18 of the Convention (Vlassis 2014).

This fund is meant to help 'developing' countries that are parties to the Convention finance policy development and training to strengthen their cultural industries in order to make them more competitive internationally. During the period 2010–2019, the IFCD has funded 105 projects in 54 countries for a total sum of some US\$7.56m. Through this fund, UNESCO has established itself as an intermediary of development aid: it administers voluntary donations through a fund that directly aims to 'develop' the cultural industries. The development of these cultural industries is, in turn, meant to foster greater development of host societies as a whole. Though in the context of a billion-dollar aid industry, the IFCD's contribution is negligible.

World Intellectual Property Organisation

The WIPO is – alongside UNCTAD and UNESCO – a specialized agency within the United Nations system. It was founded in 1967 in an attempt to both strengthen and harmonize intellectual property legislation and enforcement around the world. Among UN organizations, WIPO is unusual in that it is almost entirely self-financing.

In the context of multilateral discussions on the creative economy, WIPO established a Creative Industries division in 2005. Given WIPO's focus on intellectual property rights and copyright, their definition and classification of the 'creative economy' come under the name of 'copyright industries'. In this view, the WIPO legal perspective uses the so-called copyright factor in order to protect the product/service of creative industries and to strengthen the link between creativity, innovation and development. In other terms, WIPO considers copyright protection as a policy prerequisite for the development of creative industries: 'copyright law aims to foster an environment in which creativity and innovation can flourish' (WIPO 2017, 4). The goal of the organization is first to collect systematic evidence regarding the economic contribution of the copyright-based industries in terms of their share in gross domestic product, generation of employment and trade. Second, the WIPO seeks to focus on the specific impact that copyright and related rights have played in the performance of the creative industries.

In this sense, WIPO sees the copyright protection as a key priority of governmental authorities insofar as this factor is of major importance in sustaining the creative economy and facilitating the exchange and consumption of creative products and services. As Francis Gurry, WIPO's Director General, stressed,

copyright is the central mechanism in the creation of the market for creative works, in the interface between the world of creativity and the economy and it is the principal means for the financing of the production of creative works.

(WIPO 2016, n.p.)

The Organisation

The Organisation was founded and was founded de Coopération (Niger). In 1995, it adopted a resolution on diversity in Mo

The OIF engaged in education. The OIF, UNESCO, and the OIF are supported by UNESCO's *Protection and Promotion*

The OIF primarily through which the importance of the OIF in function of the OIF industries at the

British Council

The British Council is a governmental organization for culture and education. The British Council is the international organization for the creative industries' and the Department of Media and Creative Industries' as the British Council for the creative industries' organization in over 100 countries. The British Council part of its work is in its own language

Implications: wh

Since the 1990s, the OIF has been used to describe the value of the creative economy as a key imaginary to the creative economy. The OIF is a greater analytic and cultural, the question of the OIF is important. One key to the demarcation of the OIF is the demarcation of the OIF

Academic debates on the OIF are of a theoretical nature. See,

The Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie

The *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie* (OIF) is based in Paris and was founded in 1997, in Hanoi, Vietnam. It has its roots in the *Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique*, founded in 1970 (in Niamey, Niger). In 1999, the OIF was the first intergovernmental organization to adopt a resolution in favour of an international legal instrument on cultural diversity in Moncton, Canada (OIF 1999).

The OIF engages with cultural industries through program funding and education. Their use of the term 'industries culturelles' is influenced by UNESCO, and this choice of terminology and classification is strengthened by UNESCO's use of 'cultural industries' in their *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*.

The OIF primarily serves to maintain a Francophone sphere of influence, through which France can assert its political, economic and cultural importance. The work it does in terms of the cultural industries is therefore in function of power and influence. The OIF's training courses in cultural industries at the Université Senghor in Alexandria, Egypt, is a case in point.

British Council

The British Council was founded in 1934 as a quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organization ('qango') charged with public diplomacy through culture and education. Its engagement with the 'creative economy' follows the international interest in and uptake of the UK's approach to the 'creative industries' under its New Labour government (1997–2010). The UK Department of Media Culture and Sport created a classification of the 'creative industries' as part of their attempt to map the sector (DCMS 1998). The British Council follows this classification in its work with cultural organization in over 100 countries around the world through its local offices. The British Council provides very limited support through grants-in-aid. Most of its work is in strategy and training, and most of this cross-subsidized by its own language training and examination around the world.

Implications: why definitions and demarcations matter

Since the 1990s, economic performance and impact have become a proxy to describe the value of arts and culture. The creative economy became the key imaginary to capture debates around this value. But in ascribing ever greater analytic and predictive importance to the economic side of arts and culture, the question of *what* should be measured became increasingly important. One key way in which this manifested is through the question of the demarcation of the cultural and creative industries.

Academic debates concerning definitions are abstract and fundamental in nature. See, for example, the debate between Daniel Mato (2009)

and Toby Miller (2009) on whether we should define industries as cultural based on their input (the creative work going into the products and services) or in their symbolic use (where cars could be seen as part of the cultural industries because the social meaning of any car is at least as important as its use value). Though when former Korean President Park Geun-hye argued that automobiles are a key part of the Korean creative economy based on the creative input into the sector, this merits a critical assessment (De Beukelaer and Spence 2019).

Policy-oriented organizations care much more about the statistical implications of the terms they use than the intellectual merit of their reasoning. The economic measurement of the creative economy increasingly served to justify private investment and public spending on the sector in order to boost its growth, and thereby social and economic development. When looking at data, definitions imply demarcations; these demarcations in turn imply scope; and scope in turn implies size. This means that claims about the size (economic turnover, employment, exports, etc.) can easily be inflated by changing the definition and thus demarcation of the sector. Table 2.1 shows which activities are part of the 'creative economy' according to different organizations.

The stark differences concerning the inclusion of particular activities across these organizations have two significant implications.

First, the classification used indicates which activities are part of the cultural, creative or copyright industries. By including very different activities, the classification used will impact the measured size of the sector – and even the place of countries or regions in the economy of creative goods and services. For instance, the UNCTAD classification strongly puts in question the dominance of the United States or of the Western economies in the global market of creative goods and services. In this sense, China's exportations are much larger than those of the United States or the combined exportations of Germany, the United Kingdom and France (De Beukelaer 2014). This has been a significant point of critique, where some commentators have noted that the inclusion of sectors like software, architecture or design have significantly increased the size of the 'creative industries' (Garnham 2005; Tremblay 2011).

Second, the inclusion or exclusion of particular activities will impact whether or not they will fall under policies for the sector. Some commentators have noted how the expansion of the 'creative industries' led to a distorted view of the sector where newer additions (software, design, architecture) generate significant economic revenues, dwarfing the contributions made by the arts (Oakley 2009; Stupples 2015); and even some the most vocal proponents of the creative economy now admit cultural policy is about more than the creative industries alone (Bakhshi and Cunningham 2016).

And yet, there are some overlaps between categories and classifications. UNCTAD, for example, uses first and second level categories, with Visual Arts being a first level category that includes paintings, sculptures,

Table 2.1 Institutional demarcations and definitions of the creative economy

UNESCO (UNESCO Institute for Statistics) Convention	UNESCO (2005)	WIPO	OIF	BC

Table 2.1 Institutional demarcations and definitions of the creative economy

	UNCTAD (‘Creative industries’)	UNESCO (UNESCO Institute for Statistics) (‘Cultural industries’)	UNESCO (2005 Convention) (‘Cultural industries’)	WIPO (‘Copyright industries’)	OIF (‘Industries culturelles’)	BC (‘Creative industries’)
Advertising	X	X (‘advertising services’)	X (‘advertising agencies and services’)	X (‘advertising agencies and services’)		X
Amusement and theme parks		X				
Archaeological sites	X	X (‘archaeological and historical places’)				
Architecture	X	X (‘architectural services’)				X
Art and antiques market	X (‘antiques’)					X
Audiovisuals	X	X (‘audiovisual and interactive media’)				
Blank recording material				X		
Books		X				
Book fairs		X				
Celebrations	X					
Clothing and footwear				X		
Consumer electronics				X		
Copyright collecting societies				X		

(Continued)

	UNCTAD (‘Creative industries’)	UNESCO (UNESCO Institute for Statistics) (‘Cultural industries’)	UNESCO (2005 Convention)	WIPO (‘Copyright industries’)	OIF (‘Industries culturelles’)	BC (‘Creative industries’)
Crafts	X	X	X		X	X
Creative services	X (‘art crafts’) X (includes ‘creative R&D, cultural & recreational’)					
Design	X	X (‘design and creative services’)	X	X	X	X
Digitized creative content	X					
Fashion	X	X (‘fashion design’)		X	X	X
Festivals	X	X (‘festivals fairs and feasts’)		X (‘festivals and events’)		
Film and video	X (‘film’)	X	X (‘cinema/ audiovisual arts’)	X (‘motion picture and video’)	X (‘film industry’)	X
Fine arts		X				
Furniture				X		
Gambling		X				
Graphic design	X	X				
Cultural and natural heritage		X				
Household goods				X		
Interior design		X				
Jewellery	X			X (‘jewellery and		

	UNCTAD (‘Creative industries’)	UNESCO (UNESCO Institute for Statistics) (‘Cultural industries’)	UNESCO (2005 Convention) (‘Cultural industries’)	WIPO (‘Copyright industries’)	OIF (‘Industries culturelles’)	BC (‘Creative industries’)
Sculptures	X					
Software	X	X		X (‘software and databases’)		X
Sound equipment		X				
Sports and recreation		X				
		(includes ‘physical fitness and well-being’)				
Television and radio	X	X		X	X	X
	(also includes ‘broadcasting’)					
Tourism		X				
		(includes ‘charter travel and tourist services’ and ‘hospitality and accommodation’)				
Toys	X			X (‘toys and games’)		
Video and computer games	X	X		X (‘toys and games’)		X
	(‘video games’)	(includes ‘online games’)				
Visual arts	X	X	X	X (‘visual and graphic art’)	X	
		(‘visual arts and crafts’)				
Wall coverings and carpets						

Source: The Authors, based on the organisations’ classifications; terms in brackets indicate slight deviations from those listed in the first column.

photography and antiques; most of which are independent categories in the definitions of other organizations. This means that the comparison above is not as refined and detailed as the table implies. The additional complexity is that independent of what these organizations measure (international trade, domestic turnover, employment, etc.), they rely on existing international datasets where activities are categorized in greater detail according to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes and Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes, which do not always neatly align with the activities as defined in the table above. The classifications of the five organizations we discuss thus conceal which precise activities feed into the aggregated datasets presented by these organizations.

‘Development’: the struggle for influence

In her book *Politicizing Creative Economy*, Dia Da Costa strongly criticizes intergovernmental institutions such as UNCTAD and UNESCO for promoting the ‘creative economy’ as a novelty, rendering it ahistorical through its temporal disconnect with existing and previous practices (Da Costa 2016). She stresses that this discursive influence ‘perpetuate[s] a hierarchical vision which assumes that innovation and creativity is advanced in the global North, while the rich repertoires of the global South are untapped, unproductive creative traditions’ (Da Costa 2016, 13). We do not follow Da Costa in this argument because it overlooks the existing approaches in creative economy business models around the world. But do take on board her critique of the need for ‘novelty’. The creative economy used as a buzzword by several IGOs (or ‘catch-words’ as Andrea Cornwall puts it) is a key way of imagining and communicating how to go about ‘doing’ development. But they are key of thinking about what development is too:

Language does matter for development. Development’s buzzwords are not only passwords to funding and influence; and they are more than the mere specialist jargon that is characteristic of any profession.

(Cornwall 2007, 471)

Critical development studies scholars have therefore not only criticized the practice of development by exposing the power relations between people, organizations and governments. They have also, and perhaps more forcefully, condemned the discursive construction of development, as it is language that creates both the problems and their solutions (see, for example, Escobar 1995; Sachs 2010).

While critical reflections on development discourse have been useful in exposing their violence, much like cultural studies has been able to expose the violence of race, class and gender, there is a need to better understand the messy and contradictory institutional practices that maintain (and often exacerbate) this violence, while claiming to resolve it. The language

Visual arts X
 Wall coverings and carpets X
 games') X
 ('visual arts and crafts') X
 ('visual and graphic art') X

Source: The Authors, based on the organisations’ classifications; terms in brackets indicate slight deviations from those listed in the first column.

used by the international institutions we discuss is itself a key feature of the discursive struggle for influence – and this power. Particularly at the level of intergovernmental and international organizations, these tensions arise manifestly. Pertti Alasuutari argues that ‘actors engaged in epistemic governance focus on three objects: ontology, identifications, and norms’ (Alasuutari 2016, 40–41).

These organizations are not monolithic entities without contradictions. Power struggles over ideas, influence and power are at their core (Vlassis 2015b). It is revealing that by the end of the 1990s, an alliance of actors including national governments, such as Canada and France; intergovernmental organizations, such as *Organisation internationale de la Francophonie* and non-governmental organizations (National Coalitions for Cultural Diversity¹), have mobilized in favor of ‘the diversity of cultural expressions’ and the establishment of an international policy tool on this principle (Vlassis 2015a). They made a strong plea for the recognition of cultural policies’ importance for balanced and equitable flows of cultural goods and services around the world, whereas the US administration called for two key norms: free trade and free flow of information and images.

Following hard negotiations on a number of issues (see von Schorlemer and Stoll, 2012), UNESCO’s General Conference adopted the *Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expressions* (henceforth The Convention) in 2005. The Convention recognizes the specificity of cultural goods and services and the importance of cultural policies for the protection and promotion of the diversity of ‘cultural expressions’ – that is, the ‘goods’ and ‘services’ created in the ‘cultural industries’. In this view, countries, such as France and Canada that made a strong plea for the Convention appeared reluctant to the inclusion of the concept ‘creative economy’ in the UNESCO’s framework (Vlassis 2018) because this includes a far broader range of products and activities than used in UNESCO’s definition. The main reason for their reluctance – or even resistance – is that the amalgamation of cultural industries and creative economy harbors a real danger: that of watering down the specificity of cultural industries by broadening them to the creative industries could undermine justifications for public support for those activities within the cultural industries that are prone to market failure (Tremblay 2011).

UNESCO also published a ‘special edition’ of the Creative Economy Report in 2013. The organization’s ‘intention is not to reach a final consensus about concepts, but to understand the nuances of the creative economy in order to support its advancement as a feasible option for development at the local level’ (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 19). In its reluctance to opt for one particular model – or perhaps its deliberate choice not to develop yet another model – UNESCO acknowledges the difficulty of working within the diversity of existing models and stresses the need to maintain a grounded and critical approach that reflects practice (‘at the local level’). With this

pluralistic approach to the discursive questions around the nature and role of the 'creative economy', UNESCO makes a comparative engagement with the sector difficult, as many stakeholders will maintain different interpretations and definitions while using the same terms.

This means that employees of these organizations, much like anyone else operating in this discursive environment, need to vie for influence and balance the three objects of which Alasuutari speaks: ontology, identifications and norms (2016, 41).

Ontologically, 'actors representing different stakeholders and views will definitely disagree on details, but the paradigmatic premises of the ensuing discourse are crucial in setting limits for counterarguments that are considered sensible' (Alasuutari 2016, 41). While the five organizations we discussed will disagree on the details, for the sake of pragmatics and tactics, they will readily use the same terms (*in casu*, 'creative economy') while they would (and do) in fact retain their own preferences – strongly based on institutional path dependence and different configurations of power. While UNESCO's Creative Economy Report built on the 'brand' of the creative economy as established by UNCTAD, they would in fact have preferred using the term 'cultural economy' – which is both narrower and more specific (De Beukelaer and Spence 2019), but also more ambiguous and political (Hesmondhalgh 2019; O'Connor 2010). The report's lead author, Yudhishthir Raj Isar (2015), implies this in his reflections on UNESCO's role in shifting the focus of the Report series.

Identifications in the context of the 'creative economy' refer to people and institutions identifying themselves as being part of a particular group or idea, in this case the creative economy. Unlike identifications that are less subject to trends and fashions (such as nations, gender, class and race), identifications of people working in both culture and development are very prone to buzzwords because these buzzwords are often intertwined with funding bodies and their programs (Cornwall 2007) – which can be both confusing and tiring for those involved (van Graan 2010). As a result, definitions and demarcations have an effect on the tasks of ministries of culture. This is the result of either the institutional competition between international organizations or different ways in which different national ministries (e.g. trade or culture) opt to follow one of these organizations.

Norms refer to the 'commonly held values and principles [...] as grounds for or against particular policies' (Alasuutari 2016, 43). While the organizations we looked into above clearly have a different focus and rationale for engaging with the creative economy, they share (also with those who – often reluctantly – identify with the creative economy) a general set of norms about what the sector's characteristics are that should be highlighted and what kind of 'development' purpose they serve.² Never mind that there is little evidence that the creative economy is socially inclusive or environmentally sustainable. Quite to the contrary: it is in fact inherently exclusionary

in terms of gender, race and class (e.g. O'Brien et al. 2016) and extremely polluting (e.g. Maxwell and Miller 2012), even if progressive policies could help to mitigate such issues (Duxbury, Kangas, and De Beukelaer 2017).

In as much as UNCTAD, UNESCO, WIPO, the OIF and the British Council provide 'aid' they provide development support primarily in the form of discursive and normative influence. Where available, budgets are very limited. But the struggle to gain the upper hand in terms of discursive influence reflects the objective of 'development' more generally: promoting a normative view of what societies *should* be. The 'aid' they offer thus mainly consists of (often unsolicited) advice about what kind of political economy countries should adopt and of defining problems in relationship to a category of actions and goals that they view as good and legitimate. This is precisely why this chapter provides an analytical account of why and how these organizations try to weigh in on the 'synchronization of national policies' (Alasuutari 2016), rather than providing an evaluative account of whether (or to what extent) they provide 'aid' through the creative economy.

In conclusion

The importance of *ontology*, *identifications* and *norms* in the struggle for dominance in terms of discourse and policy means that the 'creative economy' simultaneously refers to one idea and many practices as it has spread around the world:

Since nation-states are to a considerable degree replicas of each other and since they are interlinked with each other through the global economy and through constant cross-border flows of people, products, services, art, and popular culture, it is no wonder that people on different corners of the world often come up with similar ideas at the same time. (Alasuutari 2016, 93)

However, while the entire world is (or perhaps *was*, as the influence of the creative economy is subsiding) taken by the promise of the creative economy, it is becoming clear that it will not deliver on its many promises (Banks and O'Connor 2017; De Beukelaer 2015). And yet, few people likely expect it will. But from a strategic perspective the term remains useful because the grand claims create an audience while its vagueness makes creative applications and use possible.

It would, however, be misleading to argue that the 'creative economy' is a simple solution to a difficult problem, even if the 'fast policy' fix does bear that promise (De Beukelaer and O'Connor 2016). It is rather a multifaceted term that functions as a discursive vortex: while problems and solutions are vastly more complex than the term (and key literature) suggests, it is both pragmatic (because strategic) and convenient (because visible) to use the term as a shorthand for a wide variety of possible solutions.

The attempts of intergovernmental and international organizations to influence policy discourse cannot be dismissed as futile, for they jointly form and maintain the discursive vortex that is of strategic use to those identifying as working in the 'creative economy'. They are, however, as much a part of a global momentum as they are able to contribute to it. Whether it is one or another organization is less important than the extent to which the particular discursive toolboxes manage to capture the context, needs and objectives of stakeholders involved in the sovereign synchronization of policies around the world.

Notes

- 1 In September 2007, 42 national coalitions for cultural diversity created the International Federation of the Coalitions for Cultural Diversity, by grouping in the aggregate more than 600 cultural professional organizations representing creators, artists, independent producers, distributors, broadcasters, and editors in the publishing, motion picture, television, music, performing arts, and visual art fields. The Federation is incorporated in Canada and has its Secretariat in Montreal.
- 2 See for example UNESCO's 2013 Creative Economy Report:

This Report will therefore focus on the contributions that cultural resources can make to drive sustainable development processes as a whole. Culturally driven ways of imagining, making and innovating, both individual and collective, generate many human development "goods", and these in turn can contribute to inclusive social and economic development, environmental sustainability and the attainment of peace and security, all goals upon which the post-2015 United Nations development agenda is predicated.

(UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 39).

References

- Adorna, T. W. (2001). *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Alasuutari, P. (2016). *The Synchronization of National Policies: Ethnography of the Global Tribe of Moderns*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Bakhshi, H., & Cunningham, S. (2016). *Cultural Policy in the Time of the Creative Industries*. London: NESTA.
- Banks, M., & O'Connor, J. (2017). Inside the Whale (and How to Get out of There): Moving on from Two Decades of Creative Industries Research. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 20(6), 637–654.
- Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in Global Governance. In M. Barnett, & R. Duvall (Eds.), *Power in Global Governance* (pp. 1–32). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2005). The Power of Liberal International Organizations. In M. Barnett, & R. Duvall (Eds.), *Power in Global Governance* (pp. 161–184). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cornwall, A. (2007). Buzzwords and Fuzzwords: Deconstructing Development Discourse. *Development in Practice*, 17(4/5), 471–484.

- Da Costa, D. (2016). *Politicizing Creative Economy: Activism and a Hunger Called Theater*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- DCMS. (1998). *Creative Industries Mapping Document*. London: DCMS.
- De Beukelaer, C. (2014). Creative Industries in 'developing' Countries: Questioning Country Classifications in the UNCTAD Creative Economy Reports. *Cultural Trends*, 23(4), 232–251.
- De Beukelaer, C. (2015). *Developing Cultural Industries: Learning from the Palimpsest of Practice*. Amsterdam: European Cultural Foundation.
- De Beukelaer, C., & O'Connor, J. (2016). The Creative Economy and the Development Agenda: The Use and Abuse of 'Fast Policy'. In P. Stupples, & K. Teaiwa (Eds.), *Contemporary Perspectives on Art and International Development* (pp. 27–47). Abingdon: Routledge.
- De Beukelaer, C., Pyykkönen, M., & Singh, J. P. (Eds.). (2015). *Globalization, Culture and Development: The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- De Beukelaer, C., & Spence, K.-M. (2019). *Global Cultural Economy*. London: Routledge.
- Duxbury, N., Kangas, A., & De Beukelaer, C. (2017). Cultural Policies for Sustainable Development: Four Strategic Paths. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 23(2), 214–230.
- Eling, K. (1999). *The Politics of Cultural Policy in France*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Escobar, A. (1995). *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Florida, R. (2002). *The Rise of the Creative Class*. New York: Basic Books.
- Garnham, N. (2005). From Cultural to Creative Industries. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 11(1), 15–29.
- Government of Australia. (2005). *Creative Nation: Commonwealth Cultural Policy*. Canberra: Government of Australia.
- Hesmondhalgh, D. (2019). *The Cultural Industries* (4th ed.). London: Sage.
- Hesmondhalgh, D., Oakley, K., & Lee, D. (2015). *Culture, Economy and Politics: The Case of New Labour. New Directions in Cultural Policy Research*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Howkins, J. (2002). *The Creative Economy: How People Make Money from Ideas*. London: Penguin.
- Isar, Y. R. (2015). Widening Development Pathways: Transformative Visions of Cultural Economy. In K. Oakley, & J. O'Connor (Eds.), *The Routledge Companion to the Cultural Industries* (pp. 477–487). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Keat, R. (2000). *Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market: Beyond Commercial Modelling*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Looseley, D. (1995). *The Politics of Fun: Cultural Policy and Debate in Contemporary France*. Oxford/Washington DC: Berg Publishers.
- Mato, D. (2009). All Industries Are Cultural. *Cultural Studies*, 23(1), 70–87.
- Maxwell, R., & Miller, T. (2012). *Greening the Media*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, T. (2009). From Creative to Cultural Industries: Not All Industries Are Cultural, and No Industries Are Creative. *Cultural Studies*, 23(1), 88–99.
- Myerscough, J. (1988). *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain*. London. PSI Research Report 672. London: Policy Studies Institute.
- Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2010). *Development Theory* (2nd ed.). Los Angeles: Sage.

- Vlassis, A. (2015b). Culture in the Post-2015 Development Agenda: The Anatomy of an International Mobilisation. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(9), 1649–1662.
- Vlassis, A. (2018). The International Politics of the Nexus ‘Culture and Development’: Four Policy Agendas for Whom and for What? In V. Durrer, & T. Miller (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Global Cultural Policy* (pp. 417–429). London/New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
- Vlassis, A., & De Beukelaer, C. (2019). The Creative Economy as a Versatile Policy Script: Exploring the Role of Competing International Organizations. *Media, Culture & Society*, 41(4), 502–519.
- WCCD. (1996). *Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development*. Paris: UNESCO.
- WIPO. (2016). *The Global Digital Content Market: Opening Remarks by Francis Gurry, Director General, World Intellectual Property Organization*. Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization.
- WIPO. (2017). *How to Make a Living in the Creative Industries*. Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization.
- Yanguas, P. (2018). *Why We Lie About Aid: Development and the Messy Politics of Change*. London: ZED Books.

I
I
t
o
c
n
a
t
n
t
f
s
(E
th
th

be
tu
in
gr
ot
EU
cu
an

fo
ad
is
the
icy
Us
ter